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Learning to hope: the role of hope in Fear and Trembling1 
John Lippitt 
INTRODUCTION 
Kierkegaard’s work contains rich discussions of several virtue-terms: faith; courage; trust; 
patience; gratitude; humility; hope. Several recent interpretations of Fear and Trembling have 
connected Abraham’s faith with some related such terms: for instance, a series of recent 
articles by John J. Davenport has treated faith as “eschatological trust”,2 while Clare Carlisle 
places courage centre-stage.3 I find myself increasingly attracted to the “faith as 
eschatological trust” reading. My purpose here is to try to complement Davenport’s account, 
by putting more emphasis than is typical on the role of hope in Abraham’s faith. (Although it 
plays a significant role in the eschatological trust interpretation, Davenport does not discuss 
hope in detail.) I aim to flesh this out by reading Fear and Trembling against the background 
of the 1843 discourse “The expectancy of faith”, one of the discourses in which – as both 
                                                 
1 A version of this article was presented as a keynote address at the conference “Kierkegaard 
in the World” (Australian Catholic University, Melbourne: August 2013). I would like to 
thank Patrick Stokes and Jeffrey Hanson for the invitation to speak at that valuable and 
enjoyable event and those in the audience whose questions and comments helped me to 
complete the final version. Thanks also to Dan Conway, whose feedback also helped me 
greatly with the final rewrite. 
2 See especially Davenport (2008a) and (2008b). Davenport acknowledges that it is “not 
entirely ‘new’, since it is indebted to past readings by Mooney, Evans, Hannay, Lippitt, and 
others” (Davenport [2008c]: 879-908 at 885n8). 
3 Carlisle (2010).  
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Robert C. Roberts and William McDonald have noted - Kierkegaard discusses the concept of 
hope in most detail.4 Then, after a brief outline of the “eschatological trust” reading of Fear 
and Trembling, I’ll discuss two possible objections thereto, arising from “The expectancy of 
faith”. Both, I’ll suggest, can be resisted. The second can be addressed by comparing 
Abraham’s hope with the “radical hope” discussed by Jonathan Lear in his book of that title. 
This reading will, I hope(!), clarify, in more detail than hitherto, the importance of hope in 
existential faith. It will also throw some light on what Johannes de silentio calls “the courage 
of faith”, and why he describes that courage as “humble”.  
Hope doesn’t exactly leap off the page as an important theme in Fear and Trembling, 
and at one point Johannes contrasts faith with a “paltry [usle] hope” (FT 30/SKS 4 132).5 The 
hope that plays a key role in Abraham’s faith must be hope of a particular kind. I shall argue 
that it is akin to what Kierkegaard in the discourses calls “expectancy” [Forventning].  
THE EXPECTANCY OF FAITH 
In the Works of Love deliberation “Love hopes all things”, Kierkegaard claims that to hope is 
to relate oneself in expectancy to the possibility of the good (WL 249/SKS 9 249). The topic 
here is not merely “episodic” hope, but rather a hopefulness that is, as Roberts glosses it, a 
“formed disposition of the person of faith”.6 
Davenport briefly discusses this discourse in his reading of Fear and Trembling. But 
commenting on this connection, Alastair Hannay remarks that “the faith that is the topic of 
                                                 
4 Roberts (2003); McDonald (forthcoming). 
5 In this article I quote from the following editions: Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard (2006)- 
hereafter FT - and Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, Kierkegaard (1998) - hereafter SKS 4.  
6 Roberts (2003), p. 187. Stan van Hooft contrasts “episodic” hope with hopefulness 
understood as “a character trait that marks a person’s way of being for significant lengths of 
time, if not their whole life” (van Hooft [2011], p. 50). On the importance of hope at times of 
spiritual trial, in the face of anxiety and potential despair, Kierkegaard’s early sermon at JP 4: 
3915/Pap. III C 1 is not to be missed.  
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the discourse is surely closer to Abraham’s attitude or state of mind before he received God’s 
command than to the pathos-filled way he saw matters after receiving it”.7 I don’t think this is 
true. Rather, on an “eschatological trust” reading, Abraham could respond – even in the face 
of the akedah experience – in the way “The expectancy of faith” discourse suggests. That is 
what I shall argue in this section.  
Aside from the fact that this discourse was published on May 16, 1843 (precisely five 
months before Fear and Trembling, published on October 16 of that year), there are several 
points in its discussion of faith that invite comparison with the later text, as we shall see. 
What is faith’s expectancy? Expectancy is clearly occupied with the future (EUD 
17/SKS 5 26), and such occupation is “a sign of the nobility of human beings; the struggle 
with the future is the most ennobling” (EUD 17/SKS 5 27). Our ability to project ourselves 
imaginatively into the future is one of the things that separate us from the animals. Faith has 
already been presented in this discourse as “the only power that can conquer the future” 
(EUD 16/SKS 5 25), and make one’s life “strong and sound” (EUD 17/SKS 5 27). But this 
battle with the future is really a battle with oneself (EUD 18/SKS 5 27), insofar as the only 
power the future has over us is that which we give it. (Compare this with Fear and 
Trembling, where in distinguishing the tragic hero from the knight of faith, Johannes says “to 
struggle against the whole world is a comfort, to struggle with oneself is frightful” (FT 
100/SKS 4 201).) The way to win this battle, the way to face the future, is compared to the 
tactic of the sailor who orients himself by looking up at the stars,  
because they are faithful; they have the same location now that they had for our 
ancestors and will have for generations to come. By what means does he conquer the 
changeable? By the eternal. By the eternal, one can conquer the future, because the 
                                                 
7 Hannay (2008), p. 242. 
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eternal is the ground of the future, and therefore through it the future can be fathomed 
(EUD 19/SKS 5 28). 
So: one conquers the future, oneself, by means of something constant, “the eternal”. But the 
“eternal power in a human being” (EUD 19/SKS 5 28) is precisely faith. And faith expects 
“victory”, interpreted as that God is working all things together for good.8 So is it this trusting 
expectancy or confidence which is at the heart of Abraham’s faith?  
Kierkegaard goes on to make several key comparisons that might remind us of the 
cast of characters in Fear and Trembling. First, we encounter a figure we might label the 
naïve hoper. This person’s default attitude of hope, which “expects victory in everything” 
(EUD 20/SKS 5 29), is simply the result of inexperience. The naïve hoper’s real position, 
Kierkegaard suggests, is to expect “to be victorious without a struggle” (EUD 20/SKS 5 29). 
Life will educate this person in the error of his ways, and he will learn that his expectancy, 
“however beautiful, was not the expectancy of faith” (EUD 20/SKS 5 29). The naïve hoper 
makes a brief walk-on appearance in Fear and Trembling, in the guise of those “[f]ools and 
young people” who make the mistake of chattering “about everything being possible for a 
human being” (FT 37/SKS 4 138). Johannes warns that what they fail to recognise is that 
whereas “Spiritually speaking, everything is possible … in the finite world there is much that 
is not possible” (FT 37/SKS 4 138). What “fools and young people” fail to recognise, like the 
naïve hoper, is that it is only with God that all things are possible.9 
Kierkegaard contrasts the naïve hoper with the troubled person (EUD 20/SKS 5 29). 
This person lacks hope: he “expects no victory; he has all too sadly felt his loss, and even if it 
                                                 
8 Kierkegaard’s text here glosses victory as “that all things must serve for good those who 
love God” (EUD 19/SKS 5 28), an echo of Romans 8: 28.  
9 Similarly, compare Kierkegaard’s contrast between youthful and Christian hope at CUP 2: 




belongs to the past, he takes it along, expecting that the future will at least grant him the 
peace to be quietly occupied with his pain” (EUD 20/SKS 5 29). To the reader of Fear and 
Trembling, this character sounds like one dimension of Johannes’ description of infinite 
resignation, in which “there is peace and rest and consolation in the pain” (FT 38/SKS 4 140). 
Davenport argues that this person is not resignation simpliciter, but resignation explicitly 
combined with the rejection of hope. This is that variety of despair described in The Sickness 
Unto Death as not wanting (and thus refusing) “[h]ope in the possibility of help, especially by 
virtue of the absurd, that for God everything is possible” (SUD 71/SKS 11 185).10  
Both are frowned upon by the man of experience, the voice of “common sense” 
(perhaps a cousin of the worldviews that Kierkegaard sometimes calls “finite worldly 
wisdom” or “sagacity”). On this person’s view, common sense suggests that one needs to 
take the rough with the smooth, such that neither naïve hope nor the complete absence of 
hope is justified:  
If one has almost every good one could wish for, then one ought to be prepared to have 
the troubles of life visit also the home of the happy; if one has lost everything, then one 
ought to consider that time reserves many a priceless cure for the sick soul, that the 
future, like a fond mother, also hides good gifts: in happiness one ought to be prepared 
to a certain degree for unhappiness, in unhappiness, to a certain degree for happiness 
(EUD 20/SKS 5 29). 
Both the naïve hoper and the troubled person are willing to “lend an ear” to the man of 
experience, and to organise their lives accordingly. But such apparent common sense contains 
a threat. The man of experience’s phrase “to a certain degree” (EUD 21/SKS 5 30) 
“ensnares” his hearers. The initially happy person is troubled by the thought this “certain 
                                                 
10 Cf. Davenport (2008a), p. 226. 
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degree” of unhappiness could apply just as easily to that one thing she cannot bear to lose 
without becoming unhappy as it can apply to those things she can far more readily give up. In 
this way, Kierkegaard warns, experience engenders doubt (EUD 21/SKS 5 30).  
Thus experience has the same potentially damaging effect as the words of Fear and 
Trembling’s “frogs in life’s swamp”, who tell the lad of Johannes’ famous story that his love 
for the princess is foolishness, and that “the rich brewer’s widow is just as good and sound a 
match” (FT 35/SKS 4 136). Note how much courage and resolution even the “knight of 
resignation” lad needs to resist their “common sense” negativity. Having checked that the 
love really is “the content of his life”, and “let it steal into his most secret, his most remote 
thoughts, to let it wind in countless coils around every ligament in his consciousness”, he  
feels a blissful sensual pleasure in letting love palpitate through every nerve, and yet his 
soul is as solemn as that of one who has drained the cup of poison … - for this moment 
is one of life and death. Having thus imbibed all the love and immersed himself in it, he 
then does not lack the courage to attempt and risk everything. He surveys the 
circumstances of life and gathers the rapid thoughts which like well-trained doves obey 
his every signal; he waves a wand over them and they scurry in all directions. But when 
they now all return as messengers of sorrow and explain to him that it is an 
impossibility, he becomes quiet, dismisses them, remains alone, and then undertakes 
the movement (FT 35/SKS 4 136-7).  
All three figures – the naïve hoper; the troubled person; and the man of experience - may be 
contrasted with the person of faith [den Troende], who says: “I expect victory” (EUD 21/SKS 
5 30). Yet against such a voice, enter now the voice of a cousin of the man of experience, 
“the earnestness of life” (EUD 22/SKS 5 31), who teaches “that your wishes would not be 
fulfilled, that your desires would not be gratified, your appetites would not be heeded, your 
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cravings would not be satisfied … it also taught you to come to people’s aid with deceitful 
words, to suck faith and trust out of their hearts, and to do this in the sacred name of 
earnestness” (EUD 22/SKS 5 31). However, Kierkegaard says, life could have taught a very 
different lesson: faced with just the same experience, two people may draw very different 
conclusions. Kierkegaard’s example is of two children being praised, reprimanded or 
punished, comparing their possible reactions of proper pride or haughtiness; humility or 
indignation; a willingness to be healed by suffering or resentment. Now: all this points 
forward to what Works of Love says about hope and despair; trust and mistrust. Both have 
access to the same evidence. When obliged to judge in the wake of ambiguous evidence, the 
existential choices that we tend to make reveal something important about our character.11  
Similarly, Kierkegaard adds, in the manner so typical of the discourses, “so also with 
you” (EUD 22/SKS 5 31). We need to learn silence in the face of our doubts: “We do not 
judge you for doubting, because doubt is a crafty passion, and it can certainly be difficult to 
tear oneself out of its snares. What we require of the doubter is that he be silent. He surely 
perceived that doubt did not make him happy – why then confide to others what will make 
them just as unhappy?” (EUD 23/SKS 5 31-2). 
The key thing is that the expectancy of faith is able to triumph over this doubt. Doubt 
has a good go at unsettling the faithful person, attempting to convince her that “an expectancy 
without a specified time and place is nothing but a deception” (EUD 23/SKS 5 32). And it is 
true that “the person who expects something particular can be deceived in his expectancy”. 
But – Kierkegaard insists – “this does not happen to the believer” (EUD 23/SKS 5 32). 
                                                 
11 Cf. WL 231/SKS 9 233. 
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Genuine hope, open as it is to the future, cannot be disappointed.12 Despite the challenges of 
life, the person of faith is able to say:  
There is an expectancy that the whole world cannot take from me; it is the expectancy 
of faith, and this is victory. I am not deceived, since I did not believe that the world 
would keep the promise it seemed to be making to me; my expectancy was not in the 
world but in God. This expectancy is not deceived; even now I sense its victory more 
gloriously and more joyfully than I sense all the pain of loss. (EUD 24/SKS 5 32)  
Consider this in light of the 1844 discourse in which Kierkegaard glosses being victorious as 
God being victorious (in line with the Lutheran idea of one’s “centre of gravity” being 
transferred to God).13 Is it not so with Abraham? Pace Hannay, I want to say that the 
Abraham of Fear and Trembling can say precisely this. What is crucial to the position 
Kierkegaard describes in this part of the discourse is the idea that the only appropriate object 
of such faith is God. He stresses that faith in human beings is always susceptible to 
disappointment (EUD 24/SKS 5 33) - though as Works of Love goes on to insist, this is no 
                                                 
12 Kierkegaard reaches the same point from a different angle in the Works of Love 
deliberation “Love hopes all things”, with his claim that hoping for something for which it is 
shameful to hope amounts to not really hoping, as genuine hope “relates essentially and 
eternally to the good” (WL 261/SKS 9 260-1). Wishing, craving and merely temporal 
expecting (that is, an expectancy which is not that of faith) can all be “put to shame” – but 
true hope cannot (WL 262/SKS 9 261). It seems clear, therefore, that the hope described at 
the opening of Repetition, for instance - which is associated with youthfulness, cowardice and 
superficiality, and which is described as “a beckoning fruit that does not satisfy” (R 132/SKS 
4 10) - is not genuine hope as Kierkegaard understands it. Perhaps this is another version of 
the hope that Fear and Trembling judges as paltry? Compare also the contrast between 
hoping and wishing in “An Occasional Discourse” (UDVS 100-1/SKS 8 204-5). On openness 
to the future, see Gellman (2003), chapter 8. 
13 “One who prays aright struggles in prayer and is victorious – in that God is victorious”, the 
last of the Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. On the “centre of gravity” point, see Hampson 
(2013), p. 22.  
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excuse for cynicism or mistrust. But God alone is our rock.14 We now read words that, once 
again, Abraham might very well have said to himself during his trial:  
if you had faith in God, how then would your faith ever be changed into a beautiful 
fantasy you had better give up? Would he then be able to be changed, he in whom there 
is no change or shadow of variation? Would he not be faithful, he through whom every 
human being who is faithful is faithful; would he not be without guile, he through 
whom you yourself had faith? Would there ever be an explanation that could explain 
otherwise than that he is truthful and keeps his promises? (EUD 25/SKS 5 33) 
Abraham’s hope is hope in the steadfast love of God. Kierkegaard then contrasts such a 
position with the “fair weather” faithful, for whom “When everything changes, when grief 
supersedes joy, then they fall away, then they lose faith, or, more correctly – let us not 
confuse the language – then they show that they have never had it” (EUD 25/SKS 5 33-4).15 
Again, the claim is that, like hope, genuine faith cannot be disappointed. 
So perhaps part of what is meant by Fear and Trembling’s repeated assertions that 
“Abraham did not doubt” and that “Abraham had faith” is that Abraham was graced the 
ability to resist the snares of this “crafty passion”. What I want to stress is that one could 
hardly do so without hope. Importantly, Kierkegaard goes on to stress that such faith and its 
concomitant hope is compatible with grief and sorrow: he has the person of faith say that “the 
hard times can surely bring tears to my eyes and grief to my mind, but they still cannot rob 
me of my faith” (EUD 26/SKS 5 34). Again pace Hannay, I cannot see why the same as 
Kierkegaard here says about grief and sorrow cannot be said of the “pathos-filled” 
                                                 
14 Thus I think Kierkegaard would view Clare Carlisle as fudging the issue somewhat when 
she describes the “courage that belongs to faith” as consisting in part in “accept[ing] the 
beloved back in the form of a gift – a gift from God, a gift from life, a gift from death, or a 
gift from love as it is incarnated in each living being” (Carlisle [2010], p. 195).  
15 On this point, compare the discussion of loss of hope at EUD 94-5/SKS 5 100-1. 
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Abrahamic Angest which Johannes stresses. Abraham’s Angest is compatible with hope, 
which is a key weapon faith has against the dangers introduced by doubt.16 But it is crucial to 
see that the hope at work here is not just a sunny optimism. Rather, I am suggesting – along 
with Paul in the epistle to the Romans – that to live in hope is not to be spared from 
“groaning” along with the rest of creation.17 
So: such hope is not mere wishing – it expects victory (construed as God’s victory). 
For this reason, it differs from “everyday” hope in that – although it is compatible with 
Angest - it is claimed to be ultimately unshakable against the snares of doubt.18 
But finally, we should note that the discourse “The expectancy of faith” goes on to 
outline two ways of not having faith. One is unsurprising: to expect absolutely nothing. But 
the other is both less obvious and more significant for our purposes: to expect something 
particular [noget Enkelt]. Kierkegaard claims: “not only the person who expects absolutely 
nothing does not have faith, but also the person who expects something particular or who 
bases his expectancy on something particular” (EUD 27/SKS 5 35). Hence a key question: is 
Abraham’s faith that he will “get Isaac back” about “something particular”? The discourse 
makes a claim that, at first glance, might seem to be in tension with Fear and Trembling: 
“The person of faith demands no substantiation of his expectancy”; he says that “it is not the 
case that the particular can substantiate or refute the expectancy of faith” (EUD 27/SKS 5 
                                                 
16 Further light is shed on this by an 1850 journal entry in which Kierkegaard discusses how a 
person who lacks a concrete impression of God’s love can nevertheless cling on to the 
thought that God is love, and that this is part of a “rigorous upbringing” in faith that will 
eventuate in a concrete God-relationship (CA Suppl. 172-3 (JP 2: 1401)/Pap. X 2 A 493).  
17 Romans 8: 22-27.  
18 Though perhaps “everyday” hope sometimes has more resilience and greater flexibility 
than Kierkegaard here gives it credit for. One form of this flexibility is hope’s ability to 
engender new constitutive hopes, as Luc Bovens puts it. For a discussion of this, see Lippitt 
(2013), pp. 136-55, especially pp. 152-54.  
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35). Precisely what does this claim amount to, and is it in tension with the Fear and 
Trembling portrayal of faith? We shall return to this shortly.  
 
DAVENPORT ON FAITH AS ESCHATOLOGICAL TRUST 
First, let me sketch an outline of the “eschatological trust” reading argued for by Davenport.19 
On this account, existential faith is “a type of eschatological hope. Eschatology in its most 
general sense refers to the final realization of the Good by divine power in this temporal order 
or its successor.”20 Compare this to the interpretation of “victory” in “The expectancy of 
faith”: God is working all things together for good.  
On the eschatological trust reading, “the telos toward which Abraham suspends his 
ethical duties to Isaac is the absurd possibility of Isaac’s survival despite God’s requirement 
that he be sacrificed.”21 What ultimately matters about the story is Abraham’s trust in the 
“absurd” promise, based on this “eschatological hope”. 
The following key elements are involved:  
1. An ethical ideal that must be recognised and willed; it is not rejected or transcended as a 
moral imperative. Abraham must continue to love Isaac “with his whole soul [Sjæl]”.22  
                                                 
19 Space limitations mean that it can be no more than a sketch. For the full picture, see 
Davenport (2008a) and (2008b). 
20 Davenport (2008b), p. 174. (Cf. [2008a], p. 200.)  
21 Davenport (2008b), p. 173.  
22 Ibid., p. 174, citing the Hong translation (Walsh has “heart” for Sjæl [FT 74/SKS 4 165]). 
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2. An obstacle thereto: “the human agent is prevented from achieving his or her moral ideal” 
by some circumstances “that make it practically impossible for the agent to secure it by his or 
her own powers”.23 God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.   
3. Infinite resignation. Having concentrated his “entire identity in commitment to” the 
ethical ideal, the agent accepts that it is “humanly unattainable” because of the obstacle. So 
the agent either stops pursuing the ideal by his own endeavours (elegiac resignation) or 
continues out of principle, without any hope of success (Beowulfian resignation).24 On 
Davenport’s view, Abraham is resigned in the first sense,25 and “he accepts that he cannot 
save Isaac if God demands him”.26 
4. An eschatological promise (requiring revelation rather than natural reason alone27) that 
the ideal “will be actualised by divine power within the created order of existence” within 
time.28 God has promised Abraham that Isaac will become “the father of a holy nation to 
bring the Word to all peoples”.29 
5. The absurd: “the content of the eschatological promise, which is only eschatologically 
possible given the obstacle (and thus appears unintelligible outside of faith)”.30 The 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 For more on these two types of resignation, see Davenport (2008a), pp. 228-29. 
25 Ibid., p. 229. 
26 Davenport (2008b), p. 174. There are elements of Davenport’s discussion of infinite 
resignation that I might want to qualify, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
27 Davenport (2008a), p. 203. 
28 Davenport considers a second possibility (“either within time, or in the hereafter as a new 
temporal series (rather than as a Platonic aeternitas)” ([2008b], p. 174.), that need not 
concern us here. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
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possibilities that, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, Isaac will not have to be 
sacrificed, or that, despite being sacrificed, he will survive to fulfil his promised destiny.31  
6. Existential faith: defined in terms of 1-5: “the agent infinitely resigns [the ideal], yet 
trusting entirely in the eschatological promise, stakes his/her identity on the belief that [the 
ideal] will be actualized by God”.32 Even at the point of willingness to sacrifice, Abraham 
believes that he will get Isaac back “by virtue of the absurd”.33  
In terms of hope specifically, this fits the thinking, in the “Tribute to Abraham”, that “each 
becomes great in proportion to his expectation”, such that “the one who expected the 
[humanly] impossible became greater than everybody” (FT 13/SKS 4 113). Abraham is 
“great by that hope whose form is [“humanly” understood] madness [Vanvid]” (FT 14/SKS 4 
113).34  
Let us consider two possible objections to such a reading: first, Johannes de silentio’s 
statement that the story of Abraham is not about “the outcome”, and second, that “getting 
Isaac back” sounds like “something particular” in the way criticised in “The expectancy of 
faith”. 
In his discussion of how “the single individual” assures himself that he is “justified” in 
standing “in an absolute relation to the absolute” (FT 54/SKS 4 155), Johannes appears to 
criticise the view that “One judges it according to the outcome”. This is what a “hero who has 
                                                 
31 In the summary of his position in (2008b), Davenport stresses only the second possibility 
(which is that apparently envisaged in Hebrews 11: 19). But much of Fear and Trembling 
(and several of Davenport’s comments thereon) are also compatible with the first.  
32 Ibid.  
33 To grasp his position in more detail, see especially Davenport’s gloss on Tolkein’s notion 
of eucatastrophe ([2008a], pp. 203-05), and his summary of how the teleology at issue in 
Fear and Trembling differs from telos in Aristotle’s sense (ibid., pp. 214-15).  
34 Compare such hope to that specifically Christian hope which Kierkegaard describes, from 
the perspective of our natural understanding, as “lunacy [Galskab]” (FSE 83/SKS 13 104). 
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become an offense or stumbling block to his age” might cry to his contemporaries (though 
our age produces no heroes). However, Johannes warns:  
When someone in our age hears these words, “it will be judged according to the 
outcome”, then it is clear right away with whom on has the honor of speaking. Those 
who talk this way are a numerous lot whom I shall designate by the common name of  
“associate professors”. Secured in life, they live in their thoughts; they have a 
permanent position and secure prospects in a well-organised state … Their task in life 
is to judge the great men and to judge them according to the outcome. (FT 55/SKS 4 
155-6, my emphasis) 
Is this a problem for the eschatological trust reading? When push comes to shove, is it not 
saying that Abraham is to be judged “according to the outcome”? After all, in a brief 
discussion of Jewish readings of the akedah, Davenport explicitly sides with the view that it 
is about the “happy ending”, rather than the original command, or both of these aspects.35 
Too much can be made of the significance of Johannes’ comments here. As Davenport 
notes, Brand Blanschard errs in this way when he asserts that “the fact that at the last moment 
[Abraham] was relieved of the need to strike is irrelevant (sic) in appraising him”.36 Few put 
it as bluntly as this, but several seem to work on a similar assumption, talking of “Abraham’s 
sacrifice” as if the sacrifice had actually taken place.37 In fact, I do not think that this passage 
is the problem for the eschatological trust reading that it might at first appear to be. For what 
Johannes is objecting to here about the “outcome” is merely sitting in judgement on “great 
                                                 
35 Davenport (2008a), pp. 198-99. 
36 Blanschard (1969), p. 116, cited in Davenport (2008a), p. 213.  
37 See, for instance, Agacinski (1998), pp. 129-150, especially p. 139. 
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men”, and not applying anything learned about them, to our own lives. The passage quoted 
above continues:  
Such conduct towards the great betrays a curious mixture of arrogance and 
wretchedness – arrogance because they feel called to pass judgment, wretchedness 
because they do not feel their lives are even remotely related to those of the great. (FT 
55/SKS 4 156)38 
There is thus a response available here to the eschatological trust reading. I take it that 
Davenport’s focus on faith as eschatological trust as a means through which “the individual is 
singularized”, coming as an “essentially particularistic attitude toward God as Thou”, is 
precisely an attempt to avoid the disinterested judgementalism Johannes condemns.39 So what 
is it that we are to learn from Abraham? The short answer is: what it means to trust and 
hope.40 My further suggestion is that Abraham serves as a precursor of the love that Works of 
Love describes as “believing all things” (a deliberation essentially about trust) and “hoping all 
things”.41 In the Works of Love deliberation “Love builds up”, which precedes these 
deliberations on trust and hope, Kierkegaard famously argues that to love is to presuppose 
love in the one loved. If that is so, then for Abraham to love his God, he must presuppose 
God as loving. Imagine, then, a version of the discussion between mistrust and love (cf. WL 
                                                 
38 Compare also Johannes’ distaste at “flirting esthetically with the outcome”: “no robber of 
churches who toils away in irons is so base a criminal as the one who plunders the holy in 
this way, and not even Judas … is more contemptible than the one who peddles greatness in 
this way” (FT 56/SKS 4 156).  
39 Davenport (2008a), p. 217. “This singularising relation is existential faith: the absolute 
duty to love God singles us out because it includes a “duty” to have faith in God as the 
ultimate person.” (Ibid.) 
40 As I have previously argued, the sub-Abrahams of “Tuning Up” demonstrate that mere 
obedience to God cannot be what makes Abraham exemplary (Lippitt [2003], pp. 22-29). On 
the theological importance of this emphasis on faith as trust as opposed to other possible 
emphases, see Levenson (2012), pp. 81-82. 
41 This seems consistent with Davenport’s general treatment of existential faith as the broader 
category of which Christian faith is a sub-category (Davenport [2008a], pp. 233). 
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228/SKS 9 230) applied to the akedah case. Mistrust will say: “All is lost! God is a 
deceiver!” But love will see God’s apparent “badness”, the “test”, as mere “appearance” (WL 
228/SKS 9 230).42 Love, we are told, knows all that experience knows – and yet trusts. If this 
loving trust is recommended for our relations to other people, how much more must it be so 
for our relation to God?  It is the same with respect to hope. Kierkegaard puts these words 
into the mouth of the truly loving person: “Hope all things: give up on no human being, since 
to give up on him is to give up your love for him” (WL 255/SKS 9 255). Again, if this is so 
of humans, how much more so of God? To give up on his trust and hope, then, would be for 
Abraham to give up his love for God.  
We turn to the second objection. Is faith in “getting Isaac back” faith in “something 
particular” in a way judged illegitimate in “The expectancy of faith”? It certainly sounds like 
“something particular” in one sense. After all, God has made Abraham a specific promise. 
But compare the “tax collector” knight of faith whom Johannes imagines fantasising about a 
sumptuous meal. He hopes against the available evidence (“he does not have four beans, and 
yet he firmly believes that his wife has that delectable dish for him” (FT 33/SKS 4 134)), yet 
if he doesn’t get this particular something, then “oddly enough – it is all the same to him” (FT 
33/SKS 4 134). Should we then extrapolate from this example? Is faith’s hope a genuine trust 
in God in a more general sense, perhaps after the fashion of Julian of Norwich’s “all shall be 
well, and all manner of thing shall be well”?43 
                                                 
42 The companion discourse to “The expectancy of faith”, “Every good and every perfect gift 
is from above”, insists that the idea that God would tempt a person is a “terribly mistaken 
belief” (EUD 33/SKS 5 42). 
43 This possibility is touched upon by Pattison and Jensen (2012), p. 9. Kierkegaard 
sometimes presents hoping “for this or for that” as “merely” temporal hope (CD Suppl. 
373/Pap. VIII 2 B 100: 2) and he seems ambivalent about the relation between “eternal” and 
“temporal” hope. In this passage (from the margin of a draft), they are presented as at war, 
but elsewhere it is noted that they grew up and played together in childhood as peers (UDVS 
113/SKS 8 215), while in his 1848 notes towards a never completed follow-up to The 
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To show why faith in “getting Isaac back” is not “something particular” in a 
problematic sense, I think Davenport’s reading can usefully be supplemented by Jonathan 




Lear’s Radical Hope discusses the fate of the Native American Crow Nation, and the reaction 
of their last great Chief, Plenty Coups (or Many Achievements), to the collapse of their 
traditional way of life. But Lear is interested in extrapolating from this discussion some more 
general lessons about radical changes in a people’s future. I want to argue that the “radical 
hope” that Plenty Coups’ attitude embodies, on Lear’s account, contains some important 
lessons for understanding Abraham as an exemplar of existential faith. If, as I think is the 
case, Abraham’s hope is “radical” in Lear’s sense, this dispels the worry that Abraham’s faith 
manifests “something particular” in the sense Kierkegaard is troubled by in “The expectancy 
of faith”.  
I’ll first outline Lear’s account of Plenty Coups’ likely reasoning. We shall then see 
how this can be applied to Abraham case, and the way in which this illustrates existential 
faith.  
                                                 
Sickness Unto Death, abandoning “hope for this life” and “the hope of eternity” are both 
amongst the dangers to be counselled against (SUD Suppl. 165 (JP 6: 6280)/Pap. IX A 500). 
44 Lear (2006). The only other attempt I know of in the secondary literature to bring Fear and 
Trembling into dialogue with Lear on radical hope is towards the end of Carlisle’s book. 
However, the primary focus of Carlisle’s discussion is the link between faith and courage, 
whereas I want to explore the link between the two texts specifically through a more detailed 
exploration of what Lear means by “radical hope”. 
18 
 
Plenty Coups had to face up to the potential collapse of life as he knew it, in which 
changed circumstances threaten to render meaningless the shared conception of what it is to 
live an excellent Crow life (in terms of its norms, values, ceremonial customs, established 
social roles, etc.) Yet Lear speculates that his reaction would make sense if we suppose him 
reasoning as follows. He recognises that there is much about the future that we don’t 
understand. Yet he considers himself to have a hopeful message (in his case from a dream 
vision) that purports to come from a divine source – and he further considers this to be 
“something to hold on to in the face of overwhelming challenge”.45 (A key part of the dream 
is to learn from the chickadee, “least in strength but strongest of mind of his kind”, who 
learns by listening, and from whom Plenty Coups takes the message that “It is the mind that 
leads a man to power, not strength of body”.46) 
To survive and possibly once again to flourish, the Crow needed to be willing to give 
up almost everything they had understood about what constituted the good life: “not a choice 
that could be reasoned about in the pre-existing terms of the good life. One needed some 
conception of – or commitment to – a goodness that transcended one’s current understanding 
of the good”.47 (Here Lear makes an explicit, if passing, reference to the “teleological 
suspension of the ethical”.) Lear reads Plenty Coups as “someone who experienced himself 
as receiving a divine call to tolerate the collapse of ethical life. This would include even a 
collapse of the concepts with which ethical life had hitherto been understood.”48 
(Note that it is this which makes such hope “radical”. It is not simply that Plenty 
Coups hopes for a future that is not entirely within his own control. While the latter might be 
argued to be a feature of most “mature” hope, most such hope does not require us to abandon 
                                                 
45 Lear (2006), p. 91. 
46 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
47 Ibid., p. 92. 
48 Ibid.  
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and then rebuild concepts such as the good with which we aim to orient ourselves in the 
world.49)   
Lear then sets out a detailed account of what might plausibly have been Plenty Coups’ 
reasoning.50 I focus here on key aspects of this that in important respects parallel the 
Abraham case:  
1. A divine source tells us that an accepted way of life is coming to an end.  
2. Our conception of the good is tied up with that way of life – precisely the way of life that is 
about to disappear.  
Thus:  
3. “in an important sense we do not know what to hope for or what to aim for. Things are 
going to change in ways beyond which we can currently imagine.”51  
Still,  
4. “There is more to hope for than mere biological survival. … If I am going to go on living, 
I need to be able to see a genuine, positive and honourable way of going forward. So, on the 
one hand, I need to recognize the discontinuity that is upon me – like it or not there will be a 
radical shift in form of life. On the other, I need to preserve some integrity across that 
discontinuity”.52  
However, there are grounds for hope because:  
                                                 
49 I am grateful to Dan Conway for pressing me to clarify this point. 
50 Ibid., pp. 92-94. 
51 Ibid., p. 93. 
52 Ibid., pp. 93-94, my emphasis. 
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5. “God … is good. My commitment to the genuine transcendence of God is manifest in my 
commitment to the goodness of the world transcending our necessarily limited attempt to 
understand it. My commitment to God’s transcendence and goodness is manifested in my 
commitment to the idea that something good will emerge even if it outstrips my present 
limited capacity for understanding what that good is.”53  
6. “I am thus committed to the idea that while we Crow must abandon the goods associated 
with our way of life – and thus we must abandon the conception of the good life that our tribe 
has worked out over centuries.54 We shall get the good back, though at the moment we can 
have no more than a glimmer of what that might mean.”55 
My suggestion is that mutatis mutandis, this general schema seems to apply also to Abraham 
qua exemplar of existential faith. Regarding 1) and 2): With the akedah command, something 
radical has changed in Abraham’s understanding of God’s covenant and thus what the future 
holds. Consequently, we can imagine Abraham reasoning as in 3). It is in this sense that 
Abraham’s situation is beyond all “human calculation” (FT 30/SKS 4 131). Perhaps such 
reasoning is what lies behind his ambiguous “final word” (“God himself will provide the 
lamb for the burnt offering, my son!” (FT 102/SKS 4 203, citing Genesis 22:8)). 4) does not 
map on precisely, but is relevant in the sense that more is at stake than the mere biological 
survival of Isaac, as the second to fourth sub-Abrahams of “Tuning Up” illustrate. Isaac 
survives in all three stories, but none illustrate faith, since in the second case, Abraham “saw 
joy no more” (FT 9/SKS 4 109) as a result of his ordeal; in the third, he blames himself for 
violating his duty to his son, considering himself to be beyond forgiveness; and in the fourth, 
Abraham draws his knife in despair and Isaac loses his faith (FT 10-11/SKS 4 111).  
                                                 
53 Ibid., pp. 94, my emphasis. 




5) seems a good description of the possible thinking behind Abraham’s despair-resisting 
hope. It is this – especially the italicised passage - that enables Abraham to say, with a 
flexibility that looks the very opposite of “something particular”, “Surely it will not happen, 
or if it does, the Lord will give me a new Isaac, namely by virtue of the absurd” (FT 101/SKS 
4 203). This is indeed a statement of “radical hope” in Lear’s sense. And 6) is akin to the 
notion of “getting Isaac back”, which Davenport describes as “an eschatological possibility in 
which we can only have faith”.56 I think the overall line for which I am arguing here is 
consistent with that of C. Stephen Evans, for whom Abraham’s trust in God amounts to a 
confidence that “God will keep his promises” – without knowing how.57 
Lear concludes that Plenty Coups’ hope was a remarkable achievement in no small 
part because it managed to enable him to avoid despair.58 Likewise, we can add, Abraham. 
But, as we stressed earlier, what makes the hope radical “is that it is directed toward a future 
goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is”.59 Thus, Lear concludes, 
“hope becomes crucial for an ethical enquiry into life at the horizons of one’s 
understanding”.60  
                                                 
56 Davenport (2008a), p. 220. 
57 See Evans’ “Introduction” to Kierkegaard (2006), xviii. Note that such a reading does not 
commit us to the idea that Abraham holds contradictory beliefs (that he both will and won’t 
sacrifice Isaac) – an interpretation that I was also at pains to avoid in earlier work (see Lippitt 
[2003], especially pp. 66-76). Nor does it present Abraham as having sussed God’s real 
intentions and called his bluff. Rather, as Evans puts it, “Abraham simply rests unwaveringly 
in his trust in God’s goodness; he believes that God will keep his promises, even though he 
does not know exactly how God will do this, and realizes that from the perspective of human 
experience, it looks impossible.” (Evans, “Introduction” in Kierkegaard [2006], xix, my 
emphasis). What I am suggesting is that drawing on Lear can enable us to gloss the italicised 
phrase – but also to show that Abraham’s hope is more radical than this way of putting it may 
at first make it appear.  
58 Lear (2006), p. 100. 
59 Ibid., p. 103.  
60 Ibid., p. 105.  
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Now, if Abraham’s hope is “radical” in something like Lear’s sense, then this enables 
us to see that hoping to “get Isaac back” is not “something particular” in the sense 
condemned in “The expectancy of faith”. Lear discusses the way in which Plenty Coups was 
able to give his people “a basis for hope at a time when it was systematically unclear what 
one could hope for. Plenty Coups’ dream held out for the Crow the hope that if they followed 
the wisdom of the chickadee (whatever that would come to mean) they would survive 
(whatever that would come to mean) and hold on to their lands (whatever that would come to 
mean)”.61 Similarly, I suggest, Abraham’s faith in God enables him to believe that all will be 
for the good (whatever that would come to mean) and that he will get Isaac back in this life 
(whatever that would come to mean). In this way, his faith is not in “something particular” in 
the problematic sense. 
Moreover, there is nothing particularly quirky about such a view of hope. John 
Macquarrie makes a similar point about both hope in the Old Testament and Christian hope. 
Discussing Abraham in particular, Macquarrie remarks that human promises tend to be 
“sufficiently specific” to know whether or not they have been kept. However, he adds,  
no such simple criteria seem to operate when we are thinking of the promises of God. 
His basic promise is to give us more abundant life. But we cannot specify the 
conditions of such a life in advance. It is only in the unfolding of history and the actual 
deepening of human life that we can say whether the promise is being fulfilled. This 
could well mean that it is fulfilled differently from the way we had at one time 
expected, for our expectation could be framed only in terms of what we had 
                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 141.  
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experienced up to that point, whereas the fulfilling of the promise might bring with it 
something new. 62 
Finally for this section, let me return briefly to “Love hopes all things” further to suggest how 
hope there seems to work at the same level of generality as the eschatological trust reading. 
Love, we are told, takes upon itself the work of hope (WL 248/SKS 9 248); hope is nothing 
without love (WL 259/SKS 9 258). To “hope all things” is the “eternal” register of what is 
expressed temporally by talking of hoping “always” (WL 249/SKS 9 249). But the help of the 
eternal is further equated with the help of the possibility of the good (WL 250/SKS 9 249-50) 
– expressed in precisely the same level of generality as we drew on Davenport and Lear to 
describe.63 Anything that does not deal with the eternal – that is, the possibility of good - is 
not genuine hope (WL 251/SKS 9 251), and – expressed temporally - “the whole of one’s life 
should be the time of hope” (WL 252/SKS 9 251).64 This is what Abraham embodies insofar 
as he does not fall into the snares of doubt.  
 
EXISTENTIAL FAITH “IN THE WORLD” 
Finally, I want briefly to suggest some connections between Abraham’s hope and both 
courage and humility, to try to shed some light on Abraham’s “paradoxical and humble 
courage” (FT 41/SKS 4 143).  
                                                 
62 Macquarrie (1978), p. 53. For more detail on how this might be seen as operating in the 
case of the akedah, see Levenson (2012), pp. 84-85.  
63 One can see something of the “infinite frailty” (WL 251/SKS 9 251) of possibility that 
Kierkegaard talks about here by trying to imagine oneself in Abraham’s situation. The 
dialogue between hope and despair (WL 254/SKS 9 253-4) is also worth reading with the 
akedah in mind. Perhaps the fourth sub-Abraham – and also the second? – has listened too 
much to despair. 
64 This is also illustrated in the case of the prophet Anna, discussed at length in the discourse 




1. HOPE’S LINK WITH COURAGE 
For Lear, radical hope plays a crucial role in a courageous life. But in line with what we have 
so far said, the Crow conception of courage had to change. Hence Lear’s suggestion is of 
more general interest for our purposes:  
Might there be a certain plasticity deeply embedded in a culture’s thick conception of 
courage? That is, are there ways in which a person brought up in a culture’s traditional 
understanding of courage might draw upon his own inner resources to broaden his 
understanding of what courage might be? In such a case, one would begin with a 
culture’s thick understanding of courage; but one would somehow find ways to thin it 
out: find ways to face circumstances courageously that the older thick conception never 
envisaged.65 
So it is, I suggest, with the hope Abraham manifests as part of his faith. That is, he finds ways 
to hope that go beyond his original understanding of God’s promise. Abraham starts with a 
relatively clear idea of what God has promised him through Isaac. But his “trial” challenges 
this expectation. One way of thinking about Abraham’s situation is that he is faced with the 
following dilemma. Does he give up this hope (perhaps in the manner of some of the sub-
Abrahams)? Or does he maintain his faith in God in a manner to which radical hope – as 
summarised above: a hope that transcends his understanding - is central? The fact that 
Abraham responds in the latter way is a key part of why Johannes presents him as exemplary 
of existential faith. 
                                                 
65 Lear (2006), p. 65. 
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The connection with courage can best be approached by considering why we consider 
courage as a virtue. Lear’s answer is because it is an excellent way of responding to the fact 
that we are finite erotic creatures: “we reach out to the world in yearning, longing, 
admiration, and desire for that which (however mistakenly) we take to be valuable, beautiful 
and good”.66 As such, “we take risks just by being in the world”.67 And here we should note 
what it means to inhabit a world:  
a world is not merely the environment in which we move about; it is that over which 
we lack omnipotent control, that about which we may be mistaken in significant ways, 
that which may intrude upon us, that which may outstrip the concepts with which we 
seek to understand it. Thus living within a world has inherent and unavoidable risk.68  
Surely this is something that Abraham learns, and as Johannes Climacus famously reminds 
us, without risk, no faith. Yet Kierkegaard’s more positive spin on this is to say that “in 
reliance on God, one dares to venture everything” (EUD 369/SKS 5 354). The relevance of 
all this to courage is that in its thinnest sense, Lear suggests, courage is “the capacity for 
living well with the risks that inevitably attend human existence”.69  
It is vital to stress that these risks are inextricably bound up with our finitude, and that 
this in turn impacts on a conception of the good life for creatures like us. In other words, 
goodness “transcends our finite powers to grasp it”.70 Indeed, “it seems oddly inappropriate – 
lacking in understanding of oneself as a finite creature – to think that what is good about the 
world is exhausted by our current understanding of it.”71 Recognition of this finitude and 
                                                 
66 Ibid., pp. 119-20.  
67 Ibid., p. 120.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., p. 121. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 122. 
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God-dependence – and embodying radical hope in the face of this recognition – is again a 
significant part of why Johannes presents Abraham as exemplary.72  
 
2. HOPE’S LINK WITH HUMILITY  
So why is Abraham’s courage “humble”? A full answer is beyond the scope of this article, 
but let me offer a provisional sketch. One preliminary answer might be that the link between 
courage and humility is what you would expect, given that in the discourse “Against 
cowardliness”, Kierkegaard equates cowardliness with pride: “cowardliness and pride are one 
and the same” (EUD 354/SKS 5 341). In this discourse, the proud person is presented as one 
who is struggling with God and wanting to do this under his own power (EUD 354/SKS 5 
341). But there is a falsity about this, since such a person needs the support of others. God, 
says Kierkegaard, will expose his solitariness as a mirage, and this he can’t stand (EUD 
355/SKS 5 342). But Abraham, by contrast, is for Johannes both genuinely solitary73 in his 
trial (unlike the “tragic hero”) and recognises his absolute dependence upon God. However, 
here too a further parallel between Abraham and Plenty Coups might help. In Plenty Coups’ 
courage, “There is no implication that one can glimpse what lies beyond the horizons of one’s 
historically situated understanding. There is no claim to grasp ineffable truths. Indeed, this 
form of commitment is impressive in part because it acknowledges that no such grasp is 
                                                 
72 The “courage of faith”, specifically, is presented in the discourse “Against cowardliness” 
as being a recognition of one’s total reliance upon God, in language that recalls Fear and 
Trembling’s references to “knights” of faith: “no one should fear to entrust himself to God 
with the idea that this relationship would deprive him of his power and make him cowardly. 
It is just the reverse. Anyone upon whom God does not confer knighthood with his powerful 
hand is and remains cowardly in his deepest soul” (EUD 352-3/SKS 5 340). (I am grateful to 
Adam Pelser for this point.) As Daphne Hampson notes, however, this dependence is not just 
a Schleiermacherean resting in another, since for Kierkegaard the self must also relate to 
itself self-reflexively; choose to be itself (Hampson [2013], p. 230, p. 245). 
73 Hence the emphasis on his “silence”.  
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possible.”74 Yet both Plenty Coups and Abraham commit “to a goodness that transcends his 
understanding”.75  This is “a peculiar form of hopefulness. … the hope for revival: for 
coming back to life in a form that is not yet intelligible”.76 This is a form of commitment far 
more akin to humility than arrogance – especially when combined with the dependence on 
God stressed above. And this is a point worth noting in a world which, as Lear notes, often 
thinks that “religious commitment breeds arrogant intolerance – as though the believers had a 
‘direct line to God’”.77 (In my experience of teaching it, this is one of the most common 
undergraduate reactions to Fear and Trembling.) In other words, what might appear as 
Abraham’s arrogance – standing as a single individual above the universal; heading for 
Moriah without discussing the matter with Sarah – can be viewed differently if one sees this 
through the lens of his humility before God, and his openness and willingness to turn the 
whole situation over to God in faith, trust and hope.78 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have argued that, read against the background of the discourse “The 
expectancy of faith”, one can find much support for a version of the “faith as eschatological 
trust” reading of Fear and Trembling that Davenport has developed out of earlier 
interpretations. Two likely objections to that position – those about “the outcome” and about 
“something particular” - can be resisted. I have also stressed the advantages of understanding 
how Abraham’s hope is “radical” in something like Lear’s sense, a focus that also throws 
some light on why Johannes claims that Abraham manifests a “humble courage”. The 
                                                 
74 Lear (2006), p. 95. (Compare here Kierkegaard’s 1850 journal remark that “the concept of 
the absurd is precisely to grasp the fact that it cannot and must not be grasped” (JP 1: 7/Pap. 
X 2 A 354).) 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.  
78 On this point, compare Carlisle’s suggestions about the “open-hearted” and “feminine” 
aspects of the courage of faith (Carlisle [2010], pp. 198-99). 
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significance of Abraham’s hope deserves more attention than it has typically been given, not 
least because Abraham serves as a striking illustration of Kierkegaard’s claim that so long as 
there is a task, there is hope (UDVS 276-7/SKS 8 371-2). 
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